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Abstract 
This brief article seeks to shed light on the interdependence that emerged in Turkish-
American relations during the Cold War era in the face of Soviet threat. The alliance was 
based on keeping the balance of power in a tight bipolar world order. On the US side, the 
inclusion of Turkey in the US defense umbrella was recognized as a primary US interest 
in pursuing the policy of containment regarding Soviet expansionism, because of the 
geopolitical position of Turkey. On the Turkish side, the US was regarded as a security 
guarantor in the face of Soviet territorial demands. Thus, the rapprochement between the 
US and Turkey in deterring Soviet aggression was shaped heavily by a strong ‘mutuality 
of interest’. The paper provides an overview of the evolution of US-Turkish relations as 
they were shaped by the realities of the Cold War era. Thereby it also illuminates 
underlying reasons for Turkey’s attachment to the West during the Cold War. This paper 
argues that the high level of Soviet threat resulted in the US and Turkey sharing common 
ground in their foreign and security policies. In order to explain the alliance behaviour 
observed, the paper adopts balance of power theory based on structural realism’s 
assumptions of international relations. 
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The end of the Second World War gave birth to a confrontation between the two 
superpowers which lasted for over 40 years. The US and the USSR vied for assuring 
influence in vital regions of the world.2  States divided into two camps, with European 
countries eventually organizing into the framework of NATO on one side and the Warsaw 
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Pact on the other. Turkey has been a critical actor in the contest. Once US adopted its 
policy of containment, the geopolitical position of Turkey made the country very 
important, given its ‘geographical proximity’ to the Soviet Union and its historical and 
cultural ties with the Middle East.3 Accordingly, the policy of containment dictated 
support to Turkey as a barrier against the Soviet threat in the Middle East and in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.4 On the other hand, the US alliance was of critical importance for 
Turkey as well. Turkey needed to protect its national security and territorial integrity in 
the face of Soviet aggression and expansionism.5 This resulted in a high level of Turkish 
commitment to the Western alliance system. 
It is important to highlight that the relations between the two countries and the 
character of their alliance went through different phases during the course of the Cold 
War. This came related to the changing levels of threat against the actors concerned, 
which implied either converging or diverging interests for the two parties, and, 
subsequently, varying levels of commitment to the alliance.  
 Since this study argues that balance of power theory can explain the changing 
imperatives and shifting motives of the two allies, it firstly deals with the theory itself. 
After a brief consideration of the US motivation to include Turkey in the Truman doctrine 
and offer the country NATO membership with the aim of forming a defense umbrella for 
Europe, the article also provides an assessment of the Turkish balancing decision in its 
alignment with the West.  
Waltz’s (1979) theory of the balance of power is based on the premise that world 
politics play out in an anarchic international environment.6 The alliance behaviour of 
states is shaped primarily by states’ reactions to ‘threats’, dictating a need to either 
bandwagon or balance. The latter may be a preferable option, even if it is not always 
possible, because systemic stability hinges on the outcome of states’ acts of balancing7 by 
forming alliances with one another against potential aggressors.8 States choose to form 
alliances to secure themselves from threats based on their respective national security 
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considerations. They add others’ powers to their own to defend against common 
adversaries, to thus manage reciprocal threats.9  
The article takes, as its working definition of the balance of power, the concept 
formulated by Palmer and Perkins;  
“…the balance of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing 
pressures, no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong 
as to threaten the security of the rest”10 
 
US considerations. Because of its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, Turkey 
was recognized as a primary ally in pursuing its policy of containment against Soviet 
expansionism and the spread of communism. In fact, Turkey was geopolitically 
designated as NATO’s southern flank, its base, and barrier against the Soviet threat in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.  
While NATO’s expansion in the Mediterranean would result in further 
responsibilities and commitments, a Soviet-Turkish rapprochement was feared.11 In that 
sense, the primary US motive was to turn Turkey into a ‘buffer zone’ between the Soviet 
Union and the Middle East, as an integral part of the containment policy of the US.12  As 
Keyman (2009: 9) argues, Turkish foreign policy throughout the Cold War was based 
accordingly on a ‘buffer state identity’.13 As Leffler summed up the military 
considerations related to this: 
“…Turkey could slow down a Soviet advance to Suez and North Africa, attack Soviet 
oil resources, provide fighter cover for bombers heading toward Moscow, bottle up 
Soviet submarines in the Black Sea, destroy Soviet shipping, and launch a possible 
ground offensive into the Soviet heartland”.14  
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Turkish considerations. Turkey needed to protect its national security and territorial 
integrity in the face of Soviet territorial claims related to Kars and Ardahan provinces, 
bases in the Dardanelles related to control over the key maritime straits leading to the 
Black Sea, having faced Soviet territorial demands in exchange for the renewal of the 
Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression of 1925. Turkey was thus 
concerned about its territorial integrity.15 Its seeking of NATO membership was thus a 
balancing move against the Soviet Union. 
 
Conclusion 
The Soviet territorial demands in 1945-1946, which would cause the revision of the 
Montreux Convention were contrary to Anglo-American interests in the Mediterranean.16 
The Soviet Union could not be allowed to dominate Turkey in this way, as this would 
have opened up space to further Soviet influence-building on three continents.17 The 
Soviet territorial demands against Turkey thus constituted the first geopolitical crisis of 
the Cold War era (Atmaca, 2014: 20)18.  
 With its inclusion in the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received military aid to 
enhance its military capabilities and its bases. Aydın (2009: 128) defines the alliance as a 
‘rule of the game’ that was based on the exchange between Turkey and the US19. 
Accordingly, in exchange for the Turkish provision of bases to monitor the Soviet Union, 
the US would supply economic aid and offer a defense umbrella under NATO 
membership to Turkey, extending ‘collective defense’ in case of military attack as 
enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Hence, in a ‘mutuality of interests’, 
Turkey would turn into NATO’s southern flank, and NATO would mean Turkey’s 
security guarantor.20  
The Turkish commitment to the Western alliance system was also actively 
manifested. Turkey deployed troops to fight in the Korean War21 – a contingent of up to 
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4,500 military personnel.22 During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Turkey appeared as 
supplementing the Western alliance, having earlier on accepted the installation of 15 
Jupiter ballistic missiles, risking ‘third world war’ at its doorstep when the Soviet Union 
raised exactly this in rationalizing its attempted deployment of missiles to Cuba. The 
alliance had its ups and downs related to the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus and 
other developments, but in general US-Turkish mutual assurance worked quite well 
throughout the Cold War – an alliance born out of the two sides’ respective considerations 
of national security. 
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